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ABSTRACT

An experimental analysis of two alternative theoretical posi
tions concerning the role of awareness and the role of reinforcement
in verbal conditioning was conducted.

Reinforcement interpretations

of verbal conditioning contend that performance gains initially result
from the direct and ’’automatic" effects of reinforcement, and that
gains occur prior to the time that the j> becomes aware of the responsereinforcement contingency.

Cognitive explanations maintain that aware

ness precedes, and is a necessary condition for, improvement in
performance.
These alternative positions were tested by investigating the
temporal relationship between the learning of awareness and the incep
tion of performance gains as a function of reinforced practice.

The

premise underlying the study was that Ss respond differentially to
social reinforcement and that it is the Si's reinforcement history on
the verbal conditioning task that is crucial for performance gains and
the learning of awareness.

To test this assumption an experimental

design in which reinforcement histories could be equated was employed.
Seventy-two undergraduate college students served as Ss.
modified Taffel procedure was used as the conditioning vehicle.

A
Dur

ing acquisition £>s received Training trials which permitted E to
control the frequency of experience with the response class designated
as "correct,”

In this way the jSs1 reinforcement histories were equated

by "forced" reinforcement "programmed" according to predetermined rates.

Frequency of selection of the "correct" response class on non-reinforced
Test trials was the performance measure.

Awareness was assessed by

notes written by Ss after each Test trial and by a detailed postcondi
tioning awareness interview.
Results supported the over-all prediction that significant per
formance gains can occur prior to or in the absence of the learning of
awareness as a function of reinforced practice.

The following conclu

sions appeared justified by the results:
1.

Reinforcement exerts a differential effect upon performance

and awareness.
2.

Social reinforcers do not have the same strengthening

effect upon all _Ss.
3.

The temporal relationship between performance and aware

ness posited by Spielberger and DeNike (1966) is an artifact of an
insensitive methodology for obtaining reports of awareness during the
conditioning task.
4.

Notes written by j3s during the conditioning task can be

reliably used for assigning ratings of awareness and unawareness.
5.

Correlated hypotheses appear to be particularly suscep

tible to erroneous ratings of awareness.
Implications of the present findings and suggestions for
further research were discussed.

viii

INTRODUCTION

The results of the early investigations of verbal operantconditioning were interpreted as demonstrating that verbal behavior,
already available to the j3, may be modified by social reinforcement
without the

being aware of the principle (contingency) by which rein

forcement was administered.

Reinforcement theorists (Krasner, 1962;

Postman and Sassenrath, 1961; Verplanck, 1962) contend that the effect
of the reinforcer is direct, and not necessarily mediated by cognitive
processes (i.e., awareness, operationally defined as the ability to
verbalize the correct response-reinforcement contingency).

According

to the reinforcement position, awareness, if and when it occurs, is a
consequence of improvement (performance gains) rather than its cause.
Recently, however, this interpretation has been questioned by
investigators favoring a cognitive explanation (Dulany, 1962; Splelberger, 1962).

They have suggested, instead, that increases in the

rate of emission of the reinforced response class (performance gains)
in verbal conditioning experiments are mediated by conscious cognitive
processes.

That is, awareness precedes, and is a necessary condition

for, performance gains.
Dulany (1962) and Spielberger (1962) have contended that the
early reported findings of conditioning without awareness were an
artifact of the method for assessing awareness.

In particular, the

early interviews or questionnaires were considered to be too brief
and general, so that when an E obtained what seemed to be conditioning
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without the

being able to verbalize the response-reinforcement (r-r)

contingency, it was due, according to Dulany and Spielberger, to the
insensitive questionnaires utilized in the postexperimental interviews.
Levin (1961), using a detailed questionnaire containing 16 questions,
tested this assumption.

The first four questions were similar to those

used to assess awareness in the early studies.

Evidence for condi

tioning without awareness was found when S's responses to the first
four questions were used as the basis for inferring awareness.
the full interview was used " . . .

When

the evidence for conditioning with

out awareness was found to have been largely accounted for by Ss who
had been aware but whose awareness was not revealed by the brief inter
view" (Levin, 1961, p. 74).
The Dulany-Spielberger explanation that performance gains in
verbal conditioning are cognitively mediated is based, in part, upon
repeated findings of a positive relationship between degree of aware
ness and amount of verbal conditioning when more sensitive and detailed
interviewing procedures are employed in assessing awareness.

Other

evidence cited in support of the cognitive position comes from studies
which have investigated the temporal relationship between awareness
and the inception of performance gains (DeNike, 1964; Spielberger,
Bernstein, and Ratliff, 1966),

To investigate this relationship

DeNike had Ss write down their "thoughts about the experiment" (notes)
after each block of conditioning trials.

Upon completion of the con

ditioning task (emission of human nouns) Sis were interviewed according
to a detailed schedule of questions similar to Spielberger (1962).

It
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was found that for 58 of the 61 j>s in the experimental group awareness
ratings made on the basis of the notes agreed with those independently
made on the basis of the interview.

Further, DeNike found that only

aware £3s showed performance gains and that increments in performance
first occurred on the trial block on which aware jis first recorded
that they had become aware of the r-r contingency.

Statistical analy

sis indicated that there was no tendency for performance to increase
during the preawareness trial blocks.

It was concluded that ".

. .

the results support the hypothesis that a cognitive learning process
mediates performance gains in verbal conditioning" (DeNike, 1964, p.
527).
Although the evidence presented by the cognitive researchers
in support of their theory appears compelling, their two main ap
proaches to investigating the events occurring in verbal condition
ing (i.e., interview procedures and temporal relationships) are not
without methodological shortcomings.

With respect to interview pro

cedures, Farber (1963) recognized the possibility that the correct
r-r contingency may be suggested during the awareness interview by
detailed questions of increasing specificity and, according to
Greenspoon (1963), each successive question may provide j3 with some
information about the contingency.

Krasner and Ullmann (1963) main

tained that the content of the interview itself may influence

to

view the conditioning task in retrospect and then formulate the con
tingency, thus verbalizing an awareness that did not previously exist.
The investigation of the temporal relationship between
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awareness and the inception of performance gains has been highly in
formative in that the problem has been narrowed down to a single trial
block.

Nonetheless, the findings of DeNike (1964) and Spielberger et

a l . (1966) are far from being unquestionable demonstrations of the
priority of a learned response (awareness) which then cognitively
mediates an increased output of the reinforced response.

The £>'s

"thoughts about the experiment" were written down only at the end of
each block of 25 trials.

Assuming that the £!s were appropriately moti

vated to receive reinforcement, an unequivocal demonstration that the
performance gains first noted on the "aware" trial block were mediated
by cognitive processes would have required the report of a confirmed
hypothesis (Spielberger and DeNike, 1966, p. 320) at the end of the
preceding trial block or early in the "aware" trial block.

Since the

"aware" trial block data do not permit this type of determination, the
argument that awareness of the contingency was a consequence of the
performance gains is equally plausible.
It was with these two cognitive approaches to the experimental
analysis of awareness in verbal conditioning that the present paper was
concerned.

The primary purpose was to investigate the temporal rela

tionship between the learning of awareness and performance gains on a
verbal conditioning task as a function of reinforcement.

A major

premise of the cognitive theory of verbal conditioning posited by
Spielberger and DeNike (1966, pp. 314 and 320) is that performance
gains (increases in the reinforced response) do not occur prior to
verbalization of a correct or correlated r-r contingency (confirmed

5

hypothesis).

A necessary prediction from this cognitive theory is that

Ss who are motivated to receive reinforcement can learn the r-r contin
gency when reinforced at a level consistent with their rate of emission
during the operant period.

That is, some Ss are apparently able to

make use of the information provided by reinforcement at this level in
forming correct or correlated hypotheses which, in turn, mediate an
increased output in the reinforced response.

Others are not.

Within the framework of reinforcement theory it has been postu
lated that social reinforcers do not have the same strengthening effect
on all Ss (Baron, 1966; Kanfer and McBrearty, 1961).

According to

Philbrick and Postman (1955) the systematic application of social rein
forcement in a verbal conditioning situation should lead to differen
tial rates of emission of the reinforced response so that some Ss do not
show an increase of the rate of emission above their operant level,
whereas others do so at varying rates.

An alternative explanation in

reinforcement terms for the learning of awareness is that it is a func
tion of the differential effects of social reinforcement upon the rates
of emission of the designated response class.

That is, it is the S's

learning history (i.e., frequency of experience with the reinforcing
stimulus) on the verbal conditioning task itself that is crucial for
the subsequent development of awareness.

A possible explanation, in

these terms, for the typical finding that some Ss learn awareness and
others do not is that the two groups have had unequal histories of
reinforced practice on the conditioning trials.

Those £s whose rate

of emission increases in response to social reinforcement will, in
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turn, experience reinforcement more frequently and will be more likely
to learn the relationship between their response and the reinforcement
given by E.
The temporal relationship between awareness and performance
gains was investigated in the present study under conditions of "pro
grammed" reinforcement, and in the absence of the usual reciprocal
interaction between Si's response on performance trials and reinforce
ment given by E.
(1955) procedure.

This was accomplished by employing a modified Taffel
The reciprocal interaction between S and E on per

formance trials was eliminated by divorcing the conditioning (Training)
trials from the performance (Test) trials and by reinforcing only on
the Training trials.

"Programmed" reinforcement was effected during

Training by using "forced" trials.

The stimulus materials (3x5-inch

cards) used contained five personal pronouns; on each Training trial
one of the pronouns was underlined.

The J3 was instructed to select

the underlined pronoun in constructing his sentence.

In this manner,

frequency of experience with the reinforced response class (and hence
reinforcement) could be programmed according to predetermined rates.
Each time the £3 was "forced" to use one of the pronouns designated as
"correct," reinforcement was given.

This design, then, treated both

the learning of awareness and the inception of performance gains as
dependent variables subject to the same Training conditions.
The second purpose of the present study was to evaluate the
extent which awareness of the r-r contingency may be suggested or in
fluenced by a detailed post-conditioning interview.

The development
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or onset of awareness was assessed by having j5s write down during the
Test trials their ideas concerning the rule or principle for construct
ing sentences in the experiment.

A postconditioning awareness inter

view adapted from Dulany (1962) and Spielberger (1962) was also
employed.

Ratings of awareness from these two sources were compared

and judgments as to whether awareness was learned during the trials or
suggested by the interview were made.
The questions investigated and the methods of inquriy were as
follows:
1.

Does reinforcement have a direct and "automatic" strength

ening effect upon performance?

That is, can there be a significant

increase in response selection on the Test trials as a function of re
inforced practice prior to or in the absence of the learning of aware
ness?

For £5s reporting awareness of a correct or correlated hypothesis

in their notes during acquisition, this was determined by comparing
their performance on the Test trials up to the point of the report.
2.

Can the learning of awareness (as assessed by jj's notes)

occur in the absence of an increase in reinforced practice on the
Training trials as Spielberger and DeNike (1966) have contended?
This was tested by "programming" one Experimental group to receive
reinforcement on each acquisition trial block at operant (chance)
level.
3.

Or, on the other hand, is an increment in reinforced prac

tice necessary for the learning of awareness to occur?
tested in two ways during acquisition:

This was
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a.

One Experimental group received "programmed" rein
forcement initially at the operant level, which then
gradually increased beginning with trial block two.

b.

Another Experimental group received "programmed"
reinforcement at the operant level on each of the
first two trial blocks with an abrupt increase in
"programmed" reinforcement on trial block three.

4.

Gan the notes written by _Ss during acquisition be reliably

used for rating awareness and for determining whether or not extended
and detailed interviews suggest awareness.

This determination was

made by initially asking each _S during the postconditioning awareness
interview to state his idea of the correct principle for constructing
sentences in the experiment.

It was expected that this statement

would show close correspondence to the principle or principles
written during acquisition.

One of the last questions asked the j3 on

the awareness interview was to again state his idea of the correct
principle.

If the £5 changed his opinion from his initial interview

statement, further questioning attempted to determine whether the
changed opinion was a function of interview suggestion or whether the
j> simply had difficulty in conceptualizing his ideas.
The over-all prediction tested was that significant perfor
mance gains (increases in the "correct" response class) can occur
prior to or in the absence of the learning of awareness as a function
of reinforced practice.
to test this prediction.

The following five hypotheses were formulated
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1.

When the verbal responses of Ss on the Training trials are

followed by "programmed" reinforcement which does not increase above
operant (chance) level, the frequency of "correct" pronoun responses
of unaware _Ss will not be significantly altered on the Test trials.
2.

When the verbal responses of j3s on the Training trials are

followed by "programmed" reinforcement which increases above operant
(chance) level, the frequency of "correct" pronoun responses of u n 
aware Ss will be significantly raised on the Test trials.
3.

The learning of awareness, if it occurs at all, will occur

subsequent to performance gains on the Test trials and as a conse
quence of the increase in "programmed" reinforcement on the Training
trials.
4.

The learning of awareness, if it occurs at all, will occur

more often among £s receiving an increase in "programmed" reinforce
ment during Training than among £>s receiving no increase in "pro
grammed" reinforcement during Training.
5.

Notes written by j3s during acquisition concerning the

principle or rule for constructing sentences in the experiment can be
reliably used for rating awareness of a correct or correlated r-r
contingency.

METHOD

Subjects
The Ss were 72 volunteers from lower division undergraduate
Psychology courses.

Each j> received four experimental points or

credits toward

course grade based upon time actually spent in

the experiment.

his

To induce motivation, however, the students were told,

when contacted regarding participation, that they could earn from one
to four points depending upon how actively they participated in the
experiment.

They.were asked not to volunteer if they were not will

ing to come under these conditions.
The Ss were randomly assigned to one of four groups.

The

three Experimental groups and the Control group each contained 18 £>s.
Males and females were equally represented in all groups.

None of the

Ss professed any prior knowledge of the experiment, nor had any pre
viously participated in a verbal-conditioning study.

Materials and Experimental Design
A sentence construction task described by Taffel (1955) was
employed as the operant-conditioning vehicle.

Each sentence was

designated as a trial; there were a total of 140 trials.
20 trials constituted the operant (non-reinforced) period.

The first
This was

followed by 120 acquisition trials consisting of four blocks of 30
trials each.

There were 20 Training trials and 10 Test trials within

each block of acquisition trials.

The trials within each acquisition

block were presented in an alternating sequence of two Training
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trials and one Test trial (i.e., 2 Training, 1 Test— 2 Training, 1
Test--etc.).
All four groups received the same instructions, and all groups
were treated alike (i.e., no reinforcement) during the operant and
Test trials.

The groups differed only during the Training trials with

respect to frequency of experience with the pronouns and, hence, rein
forcement .
The stimulus materials consisted of 140 3x5-inch plain white
cards.^

Typed on each card were two different neutral past tense verbs

taken from the list used by Binder and Salop (1961), plus the five
pronouns (I, WE, YOU, HE, THEY).

The order of appearance of the pro

nouns was randomized over all cards within the operant period and over
all cards within the acquisition period.
During the operant period j3's task was to construct a sentence,
using either verb, and to begin the sentence with any one of the pro
nouns.

No response was reinforced on these 20 trials in order to

establish each S's operant rate for selecting the various pronouns.
On each of the 80 Training cards one of the five pronouns was
underlined.

The jj's task was to construct a sentence using either of

the verbs and beginning with the underlined pronoun.

This procedure

of using "forced" Training trials enabled E to control or "program"
the frequency of experience with each pronoun and, hence, the

^•The stimulus materials used on the 40 Test trials actually
consisted of 2 3/4 x 8 1/2-inch plain white strips of paper. However,
these materials are referred to as cards for simplicity of discussion.
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occurrence of reinforcement.

That is, each time an j> in an Experi

mental group was "forced" to use one of the underlined pronouns
designated as "correct" in constructing a sentence, he was reinforced
with a mild affirmatory word ("Good," "Fine," or "Mmm-hmm") at the end
of the sentence.

Each _S was reinforced for sentences beginning with

I and WE or HE and THEY.

Since all Experimental groups were initially

reinforced at chance level (40%) on the early Training trials, it was
important that the operant rate and the initial rate of "programmed"
reinforcement be matched as closely as possible.

In order to facili

tate this matching the "correct" pronoun class (I and WE or HE and
THEY) reinforced for any given

on the Training trials was the one

selected by the £5 during the operant period which most closely
approached chance level.
The learning (reinforcement) history was "programmed" by
using different sets of cards for each Experimental group on the
Training trials.

One group, designated as No Increase (NI), was re

inforced at chance level (40%) over all 80 Training trials.

This was

accomplished by underlining the "correct" pronoun on eight cards
(four each of the response class reinforced) out of every 20 Train
ing cards within each acquisition block (see Table I).

The other

three non-reinforced pronouns were each underlined on four of the
remaining 12 Training cards.

Thus, Ss in Group NI were forced to use

a "correct" pronoun eight times out of each 20 Training trials and,
consequently, received eight social reinforcements.

In this way, fre

quency of selection of the "correct" pronoun class could be "programmed"
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TABLE I
PREDETERMINED FREQUENCY OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE "CORRECT"
RESPONSE CLASS OUT OF EVERY TWENTY TRAINING TRIALS
ON EACH OF THE FOUR ACQUISITION BLOCKS
(Each Block Subdivided for Trend Illustration)

Experimental
Group

Acquisition Blocks
2
3

1
FHa

SHb

NI

4

GI
AI

Reinforcement
over trials

4

FH

SH

FH

SH

FH

SH

No.

1

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

32

40

4

4

5

6

7

7

7

8

48

60

4

4

4

4

7

8

8

8

47

59

First half of each acquisition block consisting of 10
Training trials.
^Second half of each block.
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during Training so that Ss in Group NI experienced no increase in fre
quency above the operant level.
The predetermined frequency of experience with the "correct"
pronoun class out of every 20 Training trials for the other two Experi
mental groups is also shown in Table I.

The 20 Training trials are

divided in half within each acquisition block to depict more clearly
the trend or pattern of reinforcement.

Group GI experienced a gradual
i

increase in frequency beginning on Block 2 and continuing through the
remaining blocks.

The group designated as Abrupt Increase (AI) was

similar to Group NI during the first half of acquisition.

On Block 3,

however, Group AI experienced an abrupt increase in frequency of experi
ence with the "correct" response class.

As can be seen in Table I,

Groups GI and AI received approximately the same number of reinforce
ments over the 80 Training trials.
The Ss in the Control group were divided into three sub-groups
of six Ss each.

On the Training trials each Control sub-group

ded to one of the Experimental groups.

correspon

In other words, the same set of

Training cards used for Group NI were used for one of the Control sub
groups, Group GI cards for one Control sub-group, and Group AI cards for
the third sub-group.

This procedure was followed on the Training trials

to control for the possibility that an increase in frequency of the
"correct" pronoun class alone might lead to an increase in selection of
these prounouns on the Test trials.

To provide some form of encourage

ment for the Control S[s, reinforcement was administered randomly for a
"correct" response on four of the 80 Training trials.
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The S/s sentence construction task on the 40 Test cards was
the same as during the operant period.

Also like the operant trials,

no response on the Test trials was reinforced.

In addition to the

sentence construction task, j3s were instructed to write down on each
Test card any ideas they had concerning the rule or principle for con
structing sentences in the experiment.

They were also instructed to

indicate how certain they were of any idea they wrote down.

Conditioning Procedure
Each S, seen individually, was seated across a 3x5 ft, table
from E in a small room.

A cardboard screen, 13 in. high and 15 in.

wide, was at one end of the table.

The screen was placed between S

and E after the instructions had been read to prevent them from
seeing each other's writing activity.

Since they could see one

another's face, E made a concerted effort to minimize visual cues
during the conditioning procedure.

Initially £> was engaged in a few

moments of conversation concerning his academic major, hobbies, etc.
to establish rapport.

Prior to reading the instructions, E asked SI

if he had any prior knowledge of the experiment.

If so, it was ex

plained that he could not be used in the study but that he would
receive an experimental point for keeping the appointment.

If S, had

no prior knowledge the following instructions were read:
This is a learning experiment.

It is similar to most new ex

periences that you have had occasion to undertake.

For example, when

you take a new course here at school you have very little knowledge
about it at the outset.

If you were tested on the first day of class
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you probably would not do very well.
gain knowledge about the course.

But by attending lectures you

This training should then help you

when you are later tested on the lecture material.
We are going to follow this same sequence of events today.

That

is, the experiment is divided into three parts, and your task during
each part will be to construct sentences.

The first part is a Pre-test

in which you will make up sentences prior to any training.
then receive training on the task and be tested again.

You will

This Test score

will be compared with your Pre-test score to see how much you improved
as a result of the training.

The only difference from the classroom

situation I described is that your Test will not occur all at once at
the end of training.

Rather, testing will occur throughout the Train

ing period and your performance will be combined into a total Test
score at the end of the experiment.
You will notice that I have three sets of cards.
were placed in a row in front of S.

(The sets

Throughout the instructions E

pointed to the respective set each time it was mentioned.)

This set

will be used for the Pre-test sentences, this set for the Training
sentences, and this set for the Test sentences.

All of the cards have

five pronouns typed on the top line and two simple past tense verbs
on the second line (E showed £5 a sample card).

Your task is to make

up a sentence using one of the pronouns and one of the verbs and say
it aloud.

Always begin your sentences with the pronoun; the verb can

be placed anywhere in the sentence you like.

On the Pre-test and Test

cards you may choose any one of the pronouns and either of the verbs
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you like.

On the Training cards, however, one of the pronouns will be

underlined.

You are to use the underlined pronoun to begin your

sentence and either of the verbs in your sentence.
need not be lengthy but,
short.

at the same time,

You will have 5to 10 seconds
I will hand you

sidered a trial.

After

the

they should not be unduly

to make up each sentence,

cards one

you have said

card face down on the table.

Your sentences

at atime.

Each card is con

yoursentence aloud, place the

When you have gone through all of the

Pre-test cards we will begin with the Training cards.
two Training cards I will hand you a Test card.

After every

We will repeat this

procedure until we have gone through all of the cards.

Now, do you

have any questions up to this point?
The Training trials are intended to help you on the Test
trials.

On each Test trial you will have one other thing to do in

addition to making up your sentence.

After saying each sentence

aloud, I would like you to write down, briefly but clearly, on the
bottom portion of each Test card any ideas that come to you concern
ing the way in which you think your sentences should be made up in
this experiment.

There is a rule or principle for constructing sen

tences in this experiment and T want to see if you are able to
determine it.

Both your verbal sentences and your written ideas will

be compared with those of other students who have participated in the
experiment to see how well you did.
discouraged.

Let me caution you not to become

It is important that you continue to apply yourself

throughout the entire experiment.
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It may well be that you will not have any ideas on the first
few Test trials concerning the way in which you think your sentences
should be made up.

If so, write the word "none.”

However, it is very

important that as soon as an idea occurs to you that you write it down
at the first opportunity you have to do so.

Don't hesitate to write

your idea down because you think it is irrelevant or foolish, or be
cause you want to wait and try it out. Write it down when it first
occurs to you because you can always change it later.

Each time you

write down an idea I would like for you to indicate how certain you
are of the idea.

You can do this simply by checking one of the choices

(guess, uncertain, fairly certain, or very certain) typed on the bottom
left hand side of each Test card.
Once you have written an idea down and it remains unchanged
you may write the word "same" on each successive Test card.

However,

as you are going through the cards, an idea different from the one you
have previously written down may occur to you.

When this happens it

is very important that you write it down as soon as it occurs to you.
Again, let me remind you not to hesitate in writing down any ideas
that you may have.

Do you have any questions up to this point?

Now let me review.
tences and

say them aloud.

On all the cards you are to make up sen
Always begin your sentences with a pronoun.

On the Test cards you are also to write down your ideas concerning the
rule or principle for constructing sentences in this experiment as
soon as they occur to you; do not say your ideas aloud to me.

Remember,

the Training trials are intended to provide you with information to
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help you perform your two tasks on the Test cards.

You will get no

information about your Test performance until the experiment is over.
Apply yourself throughout the experiment so that you will compare
favorably with, or better than, other students.

Once you begin, I do

not want you to ask any questions unless you are puzzled about the
procedure, or to make any comments until you have finished.
have any questions?

Do you

(Where necessary, instructions were repeated.

Questions concerning the purpose of the experiment were answered with
the assurance that it would be explained afterwards.)
1 am going to place this cardboard screen between us.

We will

be able to see one another but I do not want to see what you are
writing and, likewise, I do not want you to see what I am recording.
Okay, let's begin.

Postconditioning Awareness Interview
Upon completion of the conditioning task, each Si was directed
to another room where he was interviewed by a second E (hereafter re
ferred to as the Interviewer) who had no knowledge of the group to
which

had been assigned nor of his performance on the conditioning

task.

The only information provided to the interviewer was the pro

noun class reinforced for each j3.
verbatim by the interviewer.

The El's responses were recorded

The questions used on the awareness

interview were adapted from those used by Dulany (1962), Levin (1961)

2
^This point was emphasized to minimize the possibility of ex
tinction occurring on the Test trials.
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and Spielberger (1962), and were modified for the present experimental
design on the basis of a pilot study.

The awareness interview is pre

sented in Appendix A.
Upon completion of the interview the J3 was told to return to
the room where the experiment had been conducted for an explanation.
The E then briefly explained the purpose of the experiment, and an
swered any questions ja posed.

The

was asked not to discuss the ex

periment with other students.

Method for Assessing Awareness
The criterion of awareness used in the present study was the
report of a correct or correlated behavioral hypothesis (Dulany, 1961;
Dulany, 1962) which, if acted upon consistently, should lead to a
high frequency of selection of the "correct" pronoun class.

Following

the procedure described by Dulany (1962), £>s who reported a correct
hypothesis were classified as aware (AW), and j3s who reported a posi
tive but imperfectly correlated hypothesis were rated as correlated
aware (CA).

The j>s who reported neither type of hypothesis were con

sidered unaware (UA),
Ratings of awareness were made independently by E and the
interviewer.

The ratings by E were inferred from the "ideas concern

ing the rule or principle for constructing sentences" (notes) written
by the £3s on the Test trials.

The interviewer's ratings were based

upon the responses given by Ss during the awareness interview.

With

respect to any particular S, if the two ratings agreed, no further
steps were taken.

In cases of disagreement between E and the
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interviewer the S s 1 verbatim awareness interview protocols were submit
ted to a judge who had no knowledge of each S's group or performance.
In addition, the judge was blind with respect to the ratings assigned
by the first two raters.

In any particular case, the final classifica

tion (i.e., AW, CA, or UA) assigned was that agreed upon by any two of
the three raters.

RESULTS

Ratings of Awareness
All Ss in the Control group were rated as UA by both E and
the interviewer.

The awareness ratings assigned to the 18 j3s in

each of the Experimental groups is shown in Table II.

Among the 54

Experimental j5s, both raters (E and the interviewer) agreed perfect
ly in rating nine j3s as AW, and agreed in classifying 33 out of 34
Ss as UA.

The one j> about whom there was disagreement was rated as

UA by E and as CA by the interviewer.

The UA classification was

based on the fact that this J3 showed no increase in performance on
the Test trials, and her notes revealed mainly position and order
hypotheses.
of 34 UA Ss.

The judge's rating agreed with that of E, making a total
Thus, it was concluded that the ratings of AW j3s and

UA Ss was highly reliable.
The remaining 11 Experimental Ss were rated as CA.

There was

agreement about seven of these between E and the interviewer.

Of the

remaining three out of four jjs, E rated two as UA and one as "probably
UA but uncertain" on the basis of the notes written by these j>s.

The

most predominant idea written by one of the j3s considered UA by E was
that he should " . . .

make similar sentences" (unqualified).

The

other wrote that the rule or principle was to ". . . try to make a
better and wider range of sentences."

In all three of these cases

the judge and interviewer agreed on ratings of CA, but both also felt
that these correlated hypotheses may have been suggested to the Ss by
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TABLE II
• AWARENESS RATINGS ASSIGNED TO THE 18 Ss
IN EACH OF THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS

Awareness Classification
Group

Unaware

Correlated
Aware

Aware

NI

11

6

1

GI

10

4

4

AI

_13

JL

_4

Total

34

11

9

24

the awareness questionnaire.

The greatest amount of difficulty in

assigning a classification of CA, and of disagreement between the
raters, was encountered with the remaining j3.

The E assigned a rating

of "possible CA"; the interviewer was "uncertain of a rating of UA or
CA"; and the judge felt that this j3 was "probably UA."

Again, both

th^ judge and the interviewer felt that the awareness questionnaire
may have exerted a suggestive influence.

In summary, reliability of

awareness ratings was considered highly satisfactory in that E and the
interviewer agreed perfectly on 49 out of the 54 Experimental S s , and
in that two of the three raters agreed on four of the other five S s .
The remaining £5 was a "toss-up" and was assigned a classification of
CA after discussion among the raters .'
The preceding discussion attests the relative ease of assign
ing ratings of AW and UA.

Hence,

the point at which the AW £3s first

recorded a correct hypothesis was readily determined, in most cases,
by an examination of their notes.

In addition, the AW Ss were quick

to verbalize the correct hypothesis during the awareness interview,
usually in response to the first question.

Conversely, UA _Ss typically

wrote ideas concerned with sentence structure or grammar, with position
preferences, with the use of active or passive verbs, with the ability
to make a story out of the two Training cards and one Test card, etc.
Like the AW Ss, the UA j>s tended to verbalize readily their incorrect
hypotheses during the awareness interview

and to adhere to them.

Twenty-two of the 34 UA £>s answered "No" to Question 13 ("con
frontation" question) and one S! answered incorrectly.

Thus, these 23
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Ss did not report correct or correlated hypotheses in their notes, in
response to a detailed awareness questionnaire, nor in response to the
confrontation question.
correctly.

The remaining 11 UA J3s answered Question 13

Three of these 11 JJs were in Group NI (No Increase), three

were in Group Al (Abrupt Increase), and five were in Group GI (Gradual
Increase).

One of the three j>s in Group NI demonstrated an increase

in performance on the Test trials.

Although answering Question 13

correctly, she stated that she '-did not figure that out," but thought
that E was saying "Good" only randomly as "encouragement to make better
and more interesting sentences."

The other two _Ss in Group NI did not

show performance gains suggesting that a correct answer to the "con
frontation" question was not indicative of an awareness that existed
during the conditioning task.

Of the three JSs in Group Al, one demon

strated no increase in frequency of selection of the "correct" pronouns
on the Test trials, whereas the other two showed slight increases:

one

of these was clearly unaware on the basis of her responses to Questions
1-12, and to the "confrontation" question she responded ". . . H e and
They possibly, in retrospect"; the other S said that he had tried the
idea of pronouns out during the experiment but that

. . i t didn't

work so.two trials later I wrote 'idea went down the d r a i n . O n e

of

the five J>s in Group GI responded to Question 13 by saying " . . .
maybe He and They."

When asked by the interviewer "When did you think

of this?," the J3 replied "Just now."

With the remaining four £s in

Group GI who answered the "confrontation" question correctly, two pos
sible alternatives existed;

(a) these _Ss were aware during the
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conditioning task and should have been classified as AW or as CA; (b)
an awareness that did not previously exist was suggested to these E5s by
Question 13.
On the basis of results reported by Spielberger (1962) it
appeared that alternative (b) should be accepted.

That is, Spielberger

found that out of six jis who responded correctly to the "confrontation"
question, five were judged to have had awareness suggested to them by
this question.

To test the possibility that awareness was suggested by

the confrontation question in the present experiment, the performance
of the four jis in Group GI mentioned above were compared with that of
the other Ss in the same group.

The performance data of these two sets

of Ss, including operant trials, were subjected to a two-factor analy
sis of variance having repeated measures (Lindquist, 1953, Type I
design) in which Groups was the between Ss variable and Trial Blocks
was the within £>s variable.

This analysis yielded a nonsignificant

effect of Groups (F less than unity) and a nonsignificant Groups X
Trial Blocks interaction (F = 1.767; df = 5/40;

jj>

.10), indicating

that the performance of these two sets of jJs did not differ from each
other.

These results, when considered together with the findings re

ported by Spielberger, strongly suggest that a correct response to the
confrontation question should not be considered indicative of a previ
ously existing awareness, and that the rating of UA for the £>s who
answered Question 13 correctly in the present experiment was proper.
In view of this it was concluded that there was no evidence that the
detailed awareness interview suggested a correct or correlated
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hypothesis to _Ss who were rated as UA both on the basis of their notes
and on their responses to the detailed questionnaire used in the pre
sent study.
The _Ss rated as CA were quite different in their note-writing
activity from either the aware or unaware £>s.

That is, the CA j3s

tended, as a whole, to be somewhat confused about the principle for
constructing sentences, to record many different ideas, and to change
their ideas frequently.

Because of this, it was difficult to deter

mine, in several cases, the point at which these j3s could be considered
aware of a correlated hypothesis, if at all, during the acquisition
trials.

It was with these j5s that the awareness questionnaire

appeared to provide cues that clarified the j>s* thoughts and chan
nelized their ideas toward a correlated report.

This vagueness and

obscurity during the conditioning task raised the questions of whether
these Ss should be rated as UA and of the extent to which cognitive
processes could be considered to have mediated performance gains on
the Test trials.

Since Adams (1957) has pointed out, however, that

one of the recurring limitations in experiments which reputedly have
demonstrated conditioning without awareness has been the failure to
eliminate the possibility that above-chance performances can be
accounted for by correlated hypotheses, these doubtful cases were
classified as CA.

Other Factors Related to Incidence of Awareness
Four Ss each from Group GI and Group Al were rated as AW, as
opposed to one _S in Group N I .

This tended to support the hypothesis
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that the learning of awareness would occur more frequently among J3s
receiving an increase in reinforcement on the Training trials.

How

ever, when correlated hypotheses were considered this difference was
negated.

There were five £3s rated as CA in the two groups which re

ceived an increase in reinforcement (Groups GI and Al) and six CA £5s
in Group NI alone.

Thus, overall, there was no difference between

%
groups with respect to incidence of awareness (See Table II).
The classifications of awareness were compared with respect to
the pronoun class reinforced.

A total of 29\Ss was reinforced for

sentences beginning with I or WE on the Training trials, and 25 Ss
were reinforced for HE and THEY sentences.

The most striking differ

ence was between the number of jjs rated as CA.

That is, reinforcement

of I-WE responses resulted in nine Ss being classified CA as opposed
to only two j3s reinforced for HE*-THEY responses.

The UA Ss were

evenly distributed between the two pronoun classes, and six of the
nine AW Ss had been reinforced for HE-THEY responses.

Analysis of Performance Data
The 20 operant trials and 40 Test trials were divided into six
blocks of 10 trials each.

Unless otherwise indicated, the data from

all six trial blocks were included in the statistical analyses reported
below.

For graphical presentation, however, the mean number of "cor

rect" pronoun responses emitted by each group on the 20 operant trials
was averaged to correspond to the mean number of "correct" responses
given by each group on each of the four Test trial blocks.
The three original Experimental groups each yielded jJs
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classified as AW, CA, and UA.
were combined into Group AW.

For purposes of analysis the nine AW £>s
Since the £3s in Group GI and Group Al

each received the same number of "programmed" reinforcements on the con
ditioning task, the one j3 rated as CA in Group Al was combined with the
four CA Ss from Group GI.

The performance of these five j3s was com

pared with the six j3s rated as CA from Group NI by means of a twofactor analysis of variance having repeated measures (Lindquist, 1953,
Type I design).

In this and all subsequent Type I analyses, Groups

constituted the between-Ss factor and Trial Blocks was the within-j>s
factor.

The analysis comparing the two groups of correlated aware JJs

yielded a nonsignificant effect of Groups (F “ .222; df ■ 1/9; £ > .20) and
a

nonsignificant Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F = .160; df =

5/45; £ > .20).

Consequently, the two groups of Ss aware of correlated

hypotheses were combined into Group CA.

The unaware Ss in each of the

three Experimental groups retained their original group designations
(i.e., Groups NI, GI, and Al).
A separate single-factor analysis of variance having repeated
measures (Lindquist, 1953, Treatments X Ss design) for each of the
three Control sub-groups resulted in a nonsignificant effect of Trial
Blocks for each sub-group (all Fs less than unity).

The performance

data of the three sub-groups were then compared by means of a Type I
anova.

This analysis yielded nonsignificant effects (all Fs less than

unity) for all three factors (i.e., Groups, Trial Blocks, and Groups X
Trial Blocks).

As a result, the data for all Control Ss were combined

into Group C for purposes of subsequent statistical analyses.
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The performances of the Control (C), Unaware (NI, GI, and Al),
Correlated Aware (CA) and Aware (AW) groups are presented in Fig. 1,
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the mean operant rates for all groups were
quite comparable and tended to cluster closely around chance level.

An

analysis of variance (Lindquist, 1953, Simple Randomized design) for
the operant trials indicated that the six groups did not differ sig
nificantly (F less than unity) during the operant period.

Observation

of Fig. 1 also indicates that the performances of the six groups
diverged over the trial blocks.

A Type I anova of the performance data

of the six groups resulted in a significant effect of Groups (F =
11.61; df = 5/66; £ C.001) and a significant Groups X Trial Blocks
interaction (F - 4.03; df = 25/330; £ <.001).

These results indicated

that the groups differed in frequency of selection of the "correct"
pronouns on the Test trials, and that the slopes of the curves in Fig.
1 differed.

In order to determine the source of the significant

effects in this analysis, separate Type I analyses of variance were
performed comparing each of the Experimental groups with Group G and
comparing the Experimental groups with one another.

Comparisons of Experimental Groups with Control Group.

When

Group NI was compared with Group C no significant effects were found
(all £S

.20).

Tests for trend (Winer, 1962) indicated that the linear

trend was nonsignificant for Group C (F - 1.95; df = 1/85; £ > .10) as
well as for Group NI (F * 3.99; df = 1/50; £ > .05).
were also nonsignificant.

All other trends

Thus, as predicted, the group performance

of unaware _Ss who received no increase in "programmed" reinforcement
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was not significantly altered and was no different from that of Control
Ss.
The anova comparing Group GI with Group C yielded a significant
Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F = 3.33; dj: *» 5/130; £ <.01) indi
cating that the performance curves of these two groups diverged over
trials.

As can be observed in Fig. 1, Group GI showed a gradual in

crease in performance over trial blocks corresponding to the '’programmed"
increase in reinforcement.

A Fest' for linear trend was significant

beyond the .001 level of probability (F = 14.75; df ■ 1/45).

When the

performance data of the two groups on the final trial block were com
pared by means of an analysis of variance (Lindquist, 1953, Simple
Randomized design), it was found that Group GI .Ss constructed signifi
cantly more Test sentences beginning with the "correct" pronouns than
did the Control JJs (F = 8.56; df * 1/26; £ <.01).

Further evidence

that the unaware £>s in Group GI showed significant performance gains
came from a test of the difference between the operant and trial block
4 group means (t ■ 2.960; df = 9; £ <.02).
As may be noted in Fig. 1, Group Al showed a gradual improve
ment in performance on trial blocks 1 and 2, followed by a greater in
crease in emission of the "correct" pronouns on trial block 3.

A test

of the difference between the operant and trial block 1 group means
was nonsignificant, but a highly significant difference was found be
tween the operant and trial block 3 means (t = 3.942; df = 12; £ <.01).
It was on trial block 3 that Ss in Group Al first experienced an in
crease in "programmed" reinforcement, suggesting a rather direct
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relationship between reinforcement and performance gains.

Tests for

trend yielded a significant linear trend (F = 19.58; df = 1/60;
<.001) and a significant cubic trend (F = 4.49; df = 1/60; £ <.05)
indicating that both the increase and the changing rate of increase
were significant over all trial blocks.

The comparison between Group

Al and Group C by analysis of variance resulted in a significant
effect of Groups (F = 8.29; df = 1/29; £ <.01) and a significant
Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F ** 5.04; df = 5/145; £ <.005).
These results, when considered together with Fig. 1, indicate that
Group AX showed a greater increase of "correct” pronoun responses from
its operant rate than did Group C.

Similar results were obtained when

Group CA and Group AW were each compared with Group C.
In summary, the preceding analyses indicated that, with the
exception of jls in Group NI, the group performance of unaware, corre
lated aware, and aware jSs each differed significantly from the per
formance of Control S s .

Comparisons were then made between

Experimental groups.

Experimental Groups Compared with One Another. As can be ob
served in Fig. 1, the performance of aware J3s was strikingly different
from that of correlated aware and unaware J3s.

This difference was

confirmed by two separate Type I analyses of variance comparing Group
AW with Group CA, and with Groups GI and Al.

(That is, Groups AW,

GI, and Al were compared in a single analysis of variance since it was
predicted that unaware ^s in Groups GI and Al would demonstrate perfor
mance gains, and since Group NI was found to be no different from the
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Control Group.)

The anova between Group AW and Group CA resulted in

significant effects on all factors:

Groups (F ■ 5.53; df ® 1/18;

£ <.05); Trial Blocks (F = 21.42; df ■ 5/90; £ <.001); and Groups X
Trial Blocks (F *» 3.80; df = 5/90; £ <.005).

Thus, Sis reporting corre

lated hypotheses constructed significantly fewer Test sentences begin
ning with "correct" pronouns than did the aware

.

Similarly, all

effects were significant in the comparison between Group AW and Groups
GI and Al.
The difference between aware and unaware jJs was not expected
and was in agreement with previous studies.

Of considerable interest,

however, was the fact that the performance of _Ss reporting correlated
hypotheses also differed significantly from that of aware S s .

The

practice in most previous studies has been to classify j>s who reported
correlated hypotheses as aware, to combine their performance data with
aware Ss, and to consider them as distinctly different from unaware
Ss.

Yet, when the performance data of the correlated aware Ss (Group

CA) and the unaware Ss (Groups GI and Al) were subjected to a Type I
anova, a nonsignificant effect of Groups (F » 1.32; df ■ 2/31; £ > .20)
and a nonsignificant Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F = 1.27;
df = 10/155; £ > . 2 0 ) were found.

Thus, the Test performance of unaware

Ss in the present experiment who received an increase in "programmed"
reinforcement on the Training trials did not differ from that of £3s
aware of correlated hypotheses.

Performance of Aware Ss prior to and after Reports of Awareness
According to the cognitive formulation of Spielberger and
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DeNike (1966), performance gains do not occur in verbal operant condi
tioning in the absence of a "confirmed" (presumably either correct or
correlated) hypothesis (p. 320),

That is, prior to confirmation an S

may be trying out various hypotheses and modifying them based upon
information provided by the reinforcer.

However, an increased output

of the reinforced response class, when it occurs, is the result
(italics added) of a confirmed hypothesis.
found that " . . .

For example, DeNike (1964)

although aware j>s indicated in the interview that

they became aware on the average about one trial block before that on
which they recorded their correct hypotheses, no performance gains
were found prior to the trial block on which these Ss wrote correct
hypotheses in their notes" (p. 528).
To investigate the sequence of events posited by Spielberger
and DeNike (1966), j5s in the present experiment were asked to indicate,
on each Test trial, how certain they were of the idea they had written
concerning the rule or principle for constructing sentences.

This was

done by Ss checking one of four choices (i.e., guess, uncertain, fairly
certain or certain) typed on each Test card.

The Test trial on which

each of the nine aware Ss indicated that he was "certain" of the rule
or principle was taken as the point of a confirmed hypothesis.

(As

mentioned above, this was difficult to determine in many cases with
Ss classified as correlated aware.

Hence, only j>s rated as AW are

analyzed under this heading.)
For purposes of this analysis the performance data of the nine
aware Ss on the 40 Test trials were divided into eight blocks of five
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trials each.

The jjs recorded the correct principle (confirmed hypoth

esis) in their notes on different Test trials.

These reports varied

from trial 14 to trial 34, with a mean of 23.7 trials.

In terms of

trial blocks, this corresponded to a range of 3 to 7 blocks, and a
mean of 5.11 trial blocks.

Eight of the nine j3s showed a performance

gain prior to the trial block on which a confirmed hypothesis was
first recorded in their notes.

With respect to "programmed" rein

forcement, five of the nine j3s first wrote their hypotheses on trial
blocks subsequent to an increase in reinforcement, two wrote them on
a trial block concomitant with an increase in reinforcement, and two
prior to any increase in reinforcement.
The performance data of the aware Ss were Vincentized (Munn,
1950) so that the trial block on which each

first recorded a con

firmed hypothesis could be aligned with respect to the same reference
point.

Since the mean trial block on which the aware jJs first re

corded a confirmed hypothesis was 5.11, and the average number of
trial blocks prior to these reports was 4.11, trial block 5 was de
signated as the "aware" trial block in a manner similar to that
described by DeNike (1964).

Each ^'s performance data on the "pre-

aware" trial blocks (i.e., trial blocks prior to the block on which
the confirmed hypothesis was recorded) were Vincentized into Vincent
fourths; the data subsequent to the block on which the report
occurred were averaged into Vincent thirds.
Figure 2 presents the Vincentized performance curve of the
nine aware £>s prior to and after the "aware" trial block designated
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as trial block 5.

In Fig. 2 the mean number of "correct" pronoun re

sponses emitted on the 20 operant trials was averaged.

For purposes of

statistical analyses, however, the 20 operant trials were divided into
four blocks of 5 trials each, corresponding to the Test trial blocks.
This set of group data will henceforth be referred to as Group AW-5.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the performance of this group showed a slight
increase in the mean number of "correct" pronouns on trial block 1
over the operant rate, and remained at that level on trial blocks 2
and 3.

A rather sharp increase occurred on the final "preaware"

trial block (block 4) followed by a decrease on the "aware" trial
block.
An analysis of variance (Lindquist, 1953, Treatments X Ss
design) of the performance data prior to the "aware" trial block
yielded a significant effect of trial blocks (F = 5.53; df = 7/56;
£ <.001), indicating that Group AW-5 selected the "correct" pronouns
with a significantly greater frequency on the "preaware" Test trials
than during the operant period.

This difference was confirmed by a t

test between the operant and trial block 4 group means which was sig
nificant beyond the .001 level of probability (t «* 4.699; df

8).

The mean number of "correct" pronouns emitted on trial block 4 was
significantly greater than on trial block 3 (J: - 3.105; df = 8;
£ <.02).

No difference was found between trial blocks 4 and 5, nor

between the operant level and trial block 1.

The data for the operant

and "preaware" trial blocks were subjected to a trend analysis (Winer,
1962) which indicated significant linear (F “ 23.70; df = 1/56; £ <.001)
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and quadratic (F = 9.22; df ** 1/56; £ < . 0 0 1 ) components.

Thus, both

the increase and the changing rate of increase were statistically sig
nificant over the "preaware" trial blocks.

When considered together

with Fig. 2, these results support the overall prediction that signifi
cant performance gains can occur prior to, or in the absence of, the
learning of awareness as a function of reinforced practice.

Reanalysis of Performance Data of Aware Ss
Since it was possible that the significant "preaware" perfor
mance gains were mediated by a lesser degree of certainty of correct
or correlated hypotheses, the data of the nine aware £>s were reanalyzed
using a more liberal criterion of awareness.

For this analysis the

criterion for the "aware" trial block was set as the block on which
each £> first indicated in his notes that he was "fairly certain" of a
correct or correlated hypothesis.

This meant, then, that the ideas

recorded by the aware Ss during the "preaware" trial blocks could not
be considered indicative of anything more than what Spielberger and
DeNike (1966) have referred to as ", . . a tentative formulation of
the correct (and presumably correlated) hypothesis" (p. 320).

The

notes of each aware j3 were re-examined, and the results are presented
in Table III.

As the Table indicates, three j3s (Nos. 5, 6, and 9) did

not meet the criterion of "fairly certain" on what might be considered
to have been their earliest "aware" trial block (based on raw data).
Instead, they were conceptualizing at an even lower level of certainty
on the "aware" trial block.

That is, all three of these j3s recorded

correlated hypotheses on the "aware" block,but one indicated that he
\
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF IDEAS RECORDED BY AWARE S s ON THE AWARE
AND PREAWARE TRIAL BLOCKS AND PERFORMANCE
ON THE PREAWARE BLOCKS (RAW DATA)

Type Hypothesis and Level of Certainty on

s

Aware
Trial
Block

1

4

2

4

II

IT

3

5

IT

4

5

n

5

5

6

4

7

2

8
9

Perf. Gains
on Preaware
Blocks

Aware Trial Block

Preaware Blocks

correct - fairly cert.

correct - uncert.

Yes

II

correl. - uncert.
mixed with in
correct ideas

No

II

II

incorrect

Yes

ii

ii

n

No

correl. - guess
ii

ii

Yes

none

Yes

correct - fairly cert.

correl. - uncert.
followed by ’’now
I'm not sure"

Yes

4

correl. - fairly cert.

incorrect

Yes

2

correl. - uncertain

correl. - guess

No

ii
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was "uncertain" of his idea, and the other two indicated that their
hypotheses were "guesses."

Subsequent to these ideas the three jjs

recorded confirmed hypotheses, thus skipping the intermediate steps in
formulating the rule or principle.

Four of the nine j>s recorded in

correct hypotheses on the "preaware" trial blocks and one ji recorded
no hypotheses.

With respect to performance gains, six of the nine

£s demonstrated an increase in frequency of the "correct" pronouns
during the "preaware" trial blocks.

The relation between an increase

in "programmed" reinforcement and the "aware" trial block was not
shown in Table III because of lack of space.

Examination of the j>s'

notes revealed that the "aware" block was subsequent to an increase
in reinforcement for two j3s, concomitant with the reinforcement in
crease for three J3s, and prior to the "programmed" increase for four
_Ss.
The performance data of the nine aware j3s were Vincentized
(Munn, 1950) in the manner described above.

The mean "aware" trial

block of the raw data was 3.89, and the average number of "preaware"
blocks was 2.89.

Thus, trial block 4 was designated as the "aware"

trial block for purposes of weighting each _S's performance data.
The "preaware" trial blocks were Vincentized into Vincent thirds; the
performance data subsequent to trial block 4 were averaged into
Vincent fourths.

This set of Vincentized group data, shown in Fig. 3,

will hereafter be referred to as Group AW-4.

Statistical analyses of

these data confirmed the following facts which may be observed in
Fig. 3:

(a) The Vincentized curve shows that performance was
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Vincentized Performance Curve for Nine Aware j3s.

Trial Block 4 Represents the Point at which Aware j>s First Recorded
Correct or Correlated Hypotheses with a Lower Degree of Certainty
(Fairly Certain or Less).
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inconsistent on trial blocks 1 and 2 followed by a noticeable rise on
trial block 3.

On all subsequent trial blocks the curve shows a

gradual increase in emission of the mean number of "correct" pronouns.
An anova (Treatments X j3s design) of the group data, including operant
trials, yielded a significant effect of trials beyond the .001 level
of probability (F => 6.63; df * 11/88); (b) When the performance data
for the operant trials and the "preaware" trial blocks (1-3) were
subjected to an analysis of variance, the effect of trial blocks was
found to be significant (F “ 2.78; df = 6/48; £ <.05), indicating that
Group AW-4 selected the "correct" pronouns with a significantly
greater frequency on the "preaware" Test trials than during the
operant period.

Further, the mean number of "correct" pronouns

emitted was significantly greater on trial block 3 than during the
operant period (J: = 2.918; jif = 8; £ <.02), but no difference was
found between the operant period and trial block 1 (£ = 1.583;
df = 8; £ > , 1 0 ) .

A trend analysis of the operant and "preaware"

trial blocks yielded significant linear (F = 8.03; df = 1/48; £ <.01)
and quadratic components (F = 5.20; df = 1/48; £ <.05) which, when
considered together with the other results, indicated that both the
increase and the changing rate of increase were significant over the
"preaware" trial blocks; (c) The difference between the group means
of trial blocks 3 and 8 was significant at the .05 level of probabil
ity (t = 2.325; df = 8), indicating that further performance gains
occurred subsequent to the "preaware" trial blocks.

Thus, even when

using a less exacting estimate of awareness, the overall prediction
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that significant performance gains can occur prior to the learning of
awareness as a function of reinforced practice was supported.

Other Factors Related to Performance
Male and female jJs within each awareness classification (i.e.,
UA, CA, and AW) were compared to determine whether there was a differ
ential effect of sex on performance.
used for these comparisons.

Type I analyses of variance were

In Group CA and Group AW males performed

better than females but the effect of Groups (Sex) as well as the
Groups X Trial Blocks interaction were nonsignificant in both analyses.
On the other hand, unaware females performed somewhat better than un
aware males.

The analysis of variance yielded a nonsignificant effect

of Groups and a significant Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F =
2.82; df = 5/160; £ <.025) indicating that, while the two sexes re
sponded differentially over trials, the unaware female jJs did not
show a greater increase in frequency of "correct" pronouns from the
initial operant level than the unaware male S s .

Considering the

results of all the groups together, it appeared that sex exerted no
differential effect on performance in the present study.
Within each awareness classification, the effect on performance
of the pronoun class reinforced was also compared.

In each classifica

tion j3s reinforced for constructing sentences beginning with HE or
THEY performed better than £3s reinforced with the other pronoun class
(I or W E ) .

Three separate Type I analyses of variance comparing the

two pronoun classes within each awareness classification were
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performed.

These analyses yielded in each case a nonsignificant effect

of Groups (Pronoun Class) and a nonsignificant Groups X Trial Blocks
interaction.

It was concluded, then, that the pronoun class reinforced

had no differential effect on the performance of S,s in this experiment.

DISCUSSION

In order to obviate the criticism of inadequate methods used
for determining awareness directed against early verbal conditioning
studies which reported conditioning without awareness, ratings of
awareness in the present experiment were carefully assessed indepen
dently from the notes written by £3s on the Test trials and from a
detailed postconditioning interview.

Utilizing such a method, the

overall prediction that significant performance gains can occur in a
verbal operant conditioning paradigm prior to or in the absence of
the learning of awareness was clearly supported by the results.

These

results were contrary to the findings reported by cognitive investi
gators (DeNike, 1964; Dulany, 1962; Levin, 1961; Spielberger, 1962;
Spielberger, ut a_l., 1966) who assessed awareness from notes and/or
detailed questionnaires in essentially the same manner.

In general,

these cognitive investigators reported that performance gains were
found only for aware j3s and that these gains were subsequent to the
learning of awareness.

On the other hand, the present results were

in agreement with those of Dixon and Oakes (1965) who used a detailed
questionnaire for inferring awareness.

Dixon and Oakes found that

when Ss were engaged in a color naming task between verbal condition
ing trials, this intertrial activity interfered with the learning of
awareness.

Yet the unaware j3s demonstrated significant performance

gains as a function of reinforced practice and were no different from
Ss not engaged in color naming and who were able to verbalize correct
hypotheses.
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Assuming that the use of similar methods and criteria for
assessing awareness led to similar judgments in the present study and
in those of the cognitive investigators mentioned above, the contradic
tory findings would appear to be due to other differences in methodol
ogy, to the interpretations of the results which the methodology
permitted and to theoretical biases.

Interpretations of results have

been primarily concerned with the antecedent conditions of behavior
change.

Cognitive investigators have stressed the learning of aware

ness as the essential antecedent condition of performance gains.
Without awareness conditioning does not occur.

While agreeing that

the learning of awareness may facilitate behavior change, reinforce
ment psychologists have denied the unique status assigned to awareness
by the cognitive investigators and have maintained, instead, that
reinforcement is both a necessary and sufficient condition of perfor
mance gains in verbal conditioning.

The results of the present

experiment will be discussed in terms of these two alternative view
points and in terms of the methodological differences which may have
accounted for the contradictory findings.
A major premise at the outset of the study was that £s respond
differentially to the same social reinforcement and that it is the j>s1
reinforcement history on the verbal conditioning task itself that is
crucial for performance gains and the learning of awareness if it
occurs at all.
tion.

Four hypotheses were formulated to test this assump
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Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1, that the frequency of "correct" pronoun responses
of unaware j>s would not be significantly altered on the Test trials
when "programmed" reinforcement did not increase above operant
(chance) level, was confirmed.

The performance of Experimental jSs

rated as unaware who received reinforcement at a level which corre
sponded to their operant rate did not differ from Control J3s.

This

finding was supported by statistical analyses and is clearly shown in
Fig. 1 (Group NI).

These unaware Ss did show a gradual, albeit

slight, increment in emission of the "correct" pronouns over trials.
Dulany (1962) has referred to these nonsignificant increases by u n 
aware Ss as ", . . time-correlated increases . , . that would seem to
be the manifestations of prior habit" (p. 117), released by situa
tional cues ". . . i n transfer--involuntarily" (p. 109).

In the

present study the situational cues were the same for Experimental
and Control £is,with the exception of frequency of experience with
reinforcement.

The fact that unaware j3s in Group NI (reinforced at

chance level) showed slight performance gains whereas Control J3s
did not suggests that reinforcement is a parameter that must be dealt
with when considering performance gains in verbal conditioning situa
tions .

Hypothesis 2
That the amount of reinforcement was related to the performance
gains of unaware Ss can be observed in Fig. 1.

Only the unaware £s

who received an increase in "programmed" reinforcement (Groups GI and
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AI) which rose above operant (chance) level showed significant perfor
mance gains, confirming Hypothesis 2.

An unexpected finding was the

relationship between the trend of performance of unaware Ss and the
pattern or trend of "programmed" reinforcement.

Subjects who received

a gradual increase in reinforcement demonstrated gradual performance
gains.

A striking relationship between the pattern of reinforcement

and performance gains was found in Group AI.

That is, significant

performance gains first occurred on the trial block in which the j3s in
Group AI first received an abrupt increase in "programmed" reinforce
ment.

Thus, the performance gains of S b who received increases in

reinforcement appeared to be a direct function of the j>s1 reinforce
ment histories in terms of the amount of reinforcement and the manner
or pattern In which it was experienced.

Spielberger and DeNike (1966)

have stated that the pattern and amount of reinforcement may facili
tate the development of hypotheses leading to awareness.

This sequence

of events is based on the assumption that the reinforcing stimulus
provides information which gives rise to cognitive states (hypotheses)
but has no effect upon performance in the absence of a correct or
correlated hypothesis.

The fact that the performance gains of unaware

Ss co-varied with "programmed" reinforcement in the present experi
ment implies, instead, that the amount and pattern of reinforcement
should be considered as performance variables.

This finding of a co-

varying relationship would appear to be consistent with reinforcement
interpretations of verbal conditioning (Krasner, 1962; Postman and
Sassenrath, 1961; Verplanck, 1962), which contend that performance
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gains initially result from the direct and automatic strengthening
effects of reinforcement, and suggests that until a change in rein
forcement is experienced by J3s who remain unaware, performance gains
are not likely to occur.

Hypothesis 3
The group performance gains demonstrated by aware Ss on the
"preaware" trial blocks also supported the overall prediction that
significant performance increases can occur prior to the learning of
awareness as a function of reinforced practice.

Hypothesis 3, that

the learning of awareness would occur as a consequence of the in
crease in "programmed" reinforcement, tended to be supported only
when a rigorous criterion of awareness was employed.

That is, 78%

of the Ss first recorded their correct hypotheses subsequent to, or
concomitant with, an increase in "programmed" reinforcement.

When a

less exacting measure of awareness was used, this proportion dropped
to 56%, indicating that Hypothesis 3 was less clearly supported.
This meant, in turn, that most of the aware f3s demonstrated perfor
mance gains prior to an increase in "programmed" reinforcement.

The

direct relationship between performance gains and "programmed" rein
forcement found with unaware j3s was not evident in the performance
gains of aware Ss on the "preaware" trial blocks, suggesting that Ss
who learned awareness in the present experiment were qualitatively
different, in some way, from those who did not.

As assessed by the

postconditioning awareness interview motivation was probably not a
factor.

That is, unaware j3s, in general, tried as hard and wanted to
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receive reinforcement as much as aware S s .

One thing was certain:

the Ss who subsequently learned awareness conditioned more readily in
response to lesser amounts of reinforcement than did j3s who remained
unaware.

This would seem to indicate that individual differences in

responsivity to social reinforcement play a significant part in verbal
conditioning experiments.

Such an interpretation is consistent with

the position of Baron (1966) and Kanfer and McBrearty (1961) that
social reinforcers do not have the same strengthening effect on all
Ss.
The finding of significant performance gains prior to reports
of awareness was in agreement with those reported by Philbrick and
Postman (1955) and Postman and Sassenrath (1961) but contrary to the
results obtained by DeNike (1964) and Spielberger, et aJL. (1966).
These latter investigators found no tendency for the performance of
Ss who subsequently learned awareness to increase on the "preaware"
trial blocks; performance gains first occurred on the trial block in
which jJs first recorded their correct hypotheses in their notes.
DeNike and Spielberger, et: al. concluded that the close temporal re
lationship between the learning of awareness and the inception of
performance gains supported the hypothesis that the performance gains
occurring on the "aware" trial block were mediated by cognitive
processes.

The J3s in these two experiments, however, recorded their

correct hypotheses only at the end of the "aware" block which con
sisted of 25 and 23 trials respectively.

Thus, the conclusion by

these cognitive investigators that the performance gains on the
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"aware” block occurred only after the Ss became aware requires the
additional assumption that awareness was learned relatively early in
the "aware" block.

DeNike and Spielberger, el: al. present, however,

no evidence to substantiate this presumed necessary condition.
The results of the present study and those of Philbrick and
Postman (1955) suggest that the hypothesized temporal relationship of
the cognitive psychologist is an artifact of an insensitive method
ology for obtaining reports of awareness during the conditioning task.
Philbrick and Postman stopped j3s at the end of every block of nine
trials in which jSs gave evidence of responding at a significantly
better than chance level (four or more "correct" responses), and
asked them to state the principle on which they were basing their
responses.

It was found that, for the entire group, there was an

average of 4.25 blocks between correct statement of the principle and
the first time the criterion was reached.

In addition, the perfor

mance curve showed a positive acceleration as the point of verbaliza
tion ("aware" trial block) was approached.
In the present study, reports concerning the rule or principle
for constructing sentences were obtained on every Test trial.

With

this method the progressive formulation of hypotheses recorded by Sis
and the degree of confidence associated with each one could be
readily determined by an examination of the _Ss' notes.

By plotting

the performance data of the aware £>s in blocks of five trials each,
a far more precise analysis of the temporal relationship between per
formance and awareness could be made.

Even when the "aware" trial
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block was determined on the basis of a less exacting criterion of
awareness than a confirmed hypothesis, the £s who subsequently learned
awareness demonstrated significant performance gains prior to reports
of awareness.

As Fig. 3 indicates, if j3s in Group AW-4 had been asked

to record their ideas only after every ten trials, reports of aware
ness would have first occurred at the end of trial block 4.

Such a

procedure would have lent itself to the erroneous conclusion that the
performance gains that occurred on the immediately preceding 10
trials were cognitively mediated.

In view of this, it would appear

that the conclusion reached by both DeNike (1964) and Spielberger, et
al. (1966) that performance gains in verbal conditioning are mediated
by cognitive processes was unwarranted and an artifact of the method
ology employed during the conditioning task for determining the
temporal relationship between performance gains and awareness.
The position of Krasner and Ullmann (1963) and other behavioral
psychologists that performance and awareness are both dependent vari
ables which can be modified directly by reinforcement was supported by
the results of the present study.

These results, when considered

together with those of Philbrick and Postman (1955), Postman and

—

-

Sassenrath (1961) and Dixon and Oakes (1965), suggest that reinforce
ment exerts a differential effect upon these two dependent variables.
It would appear that reinforcement predominantly influences perfor
mance, so that performance gains may be expected to precede in time
the learning of awareness.

This interpretation is consistent with

that of Postman and Sassenrath (1961) who have stated that " . . .
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since verbalization often occurs after a period of systematic improve
ment, verbalization of a principle may be considered at the same time
a result of past improvement and a condition of further improvement’1
(p. 124).

This is not to say that verbalization can occur only after

an improvement in performance but that this is the most probable
sequence of events.

Such was the case in the present experiment; as

can be seen in Table III, two-thirds of the aware j3s demonstrated
performance gains prior to reports of awareness whereas one-third did
not.

Thus, while awareness may precede performance gains in verbal

conditioning in some instances, present evidence supports the position
of Postman and Sassenrath that the opposite is most likely to occur.

Hypothesis 4
This hypothesis, that the learning of awareness would occur
more often among j3s receiving an increase in "programmed" reinforce
ment than among j3s receiving no increase, was not accepted.
ing only j>s rated as aware, the hypothesis was supported.

Consider
But when

Ss rated as correlated aware were considered, it was found that more
jjs in the group receiving no increase in reinforcement reported
awareness than jjs in the groups receiving the "programmed" increase.
In any event, the finding that aware

learned awareness prior to

an increase in "programmed" reinforcement rendered Hypothesis 4 vapid.

Ratings made from Notes and Awareness Interview
It was concluded that the notes written by jjs during the con
ditioning task concerning the rule or principle for constructing
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sentences in the present experiment could reliably be used for assign
ing ratings of aware or unaware.

This was generally true for j3s rated

as correlated aware, although in some cases a determination could not
be made from the notes alone.

Thus, Hypothesis 5 was confirmed.

This

finding was in agreement with DeNike (1964) who concluded that note
writing and interview techniques appeared to ". . . yield essentially
comparable results in distinguishing between aware and unaware £3s,
and that the biasing effects introduced by interviewing £3s after the
conditioning period are not large" (p. 528).
The fact that there was no difficulty in rating Ss as unaware
on the basis of their notes or responses to the detailed postcondi
tioning questionnaire in the present study, and the finding of no
tendency for the questionnaire to suggest a correct or correlated
hypothesis to unaware j>s would appear to have important implica
tions for an unexpected finding reported by Levin (1961).

Levin found

that 13 Ss classified as unaware of a correct contingency had also
been unaware of the reinforcer.

They did not spontaneously mention

during the interview that E had said "Good" during the conditioning
trials, yet these J3s showed as much conditioning as the aware group.
Levin attempted to explain this discrepancy as possibly due to an
artifact in his interviewing procedure.

Questions 8 through 10 were

designed to investigate the S/s awareness of the reinforcer, and,
when £3 still had not mentioned at the end of Question 10 that the JS
had said "Good" during the trials, the interview was terminated since
all the remaining questions included wording to the effect that E had
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in fact said "Good."

Levin concluded:

"It is possible that these j»s

misunderstood question 10 and might have realized a correct contin
gency had they been interviewed further" (1961, p. 73),
Such a conclusion seems to be highly speculative since both
questions 9 and 10 used by Levin were quite pointed as to E's activ
ity during the conditioning trials.

That is, Question 10 asked "Were

you aware that I said anything?" (Levin, 1961, p. 68).

In the present

experiment only one j> could not answer this question correctly; she
remembered that E had said something but not sure what it w a s .

It

was pointed out to her by the interviewer that E had said "Good," and
the interview continued; she was unable to answer the confrontation
question.

On the basis of both her notes and the entire question

naire she was clearly unaware.

Yet this S, like the ones in the

Levin (1961) study, demonstrated performance gains.

Admittedly an N

of one is a rather small sample from which to generalize.

But since

this type of j3--i.e., one who was unaware of the reinforcer--has been
encountered so infrequently in studies where j3s have been carefully
interviewed, a sample of one may be representative.

This case, when

considered with the findings of DeNike (1964) and of the present
study (that j3s who were unaware during the conditioning task remained
unaware during the postconditioning interview, and that j3s rated
as correlated aware were not lacking in ideas and, at bottom, knew
that IS had said "Good"), implies that the 13 j5s in Levin's study
were, in fact, unaware.

There should be no need for the interviewer

to have to make a supposedly aware j3 aware that E had occasionally
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said ’’Good."

To argue otherwise is to beg the question.

Correlated Hypotheses
Farber (1963) has suggested that cognitively oriented investi
gators, in their eagerness to attribute behavior to conscious mediating
processes, might sometimes inadvertently suggest, or erroneously infer,
awareness in questioning jis who demonstrated performance gains.

Re

sults of the present experiment indicated that a detailed question
naire increased the probability of correlated hypotheses being suggested
to Ss.

In some cases, the previous existence of such hypotheses could

have been seriously challenged on the basis of notes written by the £>s
during the conditioning task, irrespective of their performance.

How

ever, Spielberger and Levin (1962) have argued that performance gains
in verbal conditioning are presumptive evidence for awareness.

While

granting that the use of a detailed postconditioning interview un
doubtedly increased the probability of awareness having been suggested
to some of their j3s, Spielberger and Levin maintained, nevertheless,
that
. . . only Ss who verbalized a correct response-reinforcement
contingency showed acquisition of the reinforced response.
Therefore, an inescapable implication of the findings of the
present study is that verbalization of awareness is an impor
tant empirical variable in verbal conditioning irrespective
of whether the j5s1 verbal reports are interpreted as indicating
awareness during the conditioning trials or awareness suggested
by the cues of the postconditioning interview [italics added]
(1962, pp. 130-131).
That there may often be a correlation between performance gains
and awareness has not been denied and, in fact, evidence for such a
relationship has been reported by behaviorally oriented investigators
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(e.g., Krasner and Ullmann, 1963; Matarazzo, Saslow, and Parels, 1960).
Nonetheless, ", . . a positive correlation between the two does not
necessarily imply that awareness mediates conditionability" (Krasner
and Ullmann, 1963, p. 201).

If, on the other hand, Spielberger and

Levin (1962) are saying that, regardless of how the reports of aware
ness are obtained (i.e., whether they are— suggested or not), the
presence of performance gains means that these gains had to be cogni
tively mediated, then such a statement would appear to be circular
reasoning.

By rigidly adhering to a theoretical bias which maintains

that awareness must precede conditioning, Spielberger and Levin have
been forced to present the consequent condition (performance) as
evidence for its presumed antecedent condition (awareness).
Dulany (1961) has maintained that, in an experiment where the
"correct" response class has been designated as plural nouns, a re
port by an S of "I am supposed to associate in a series when you say
'Umhmmm111 should be considered as a correlated hypothesis for "I am
supposed to say plural nouns" (p. 260).

Evidence obtained from the

data of Ss classified as correlated aware in the present experiment
suggests, however, that Dulany's assumption may sometimes be an
overstatement leading to erroneous judgments of awareness for £>s
who demonstrated performance gains.

For example, an £5 who was rein

forced for I-WE sentences in the present experiment wrote in her
notes that the rule for constructing sentences was " . . .
relate the sentences to our own experiences."

whether we

This type of verbal

report is considered by cognitive investigators (as well as in the
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present experiment) as prima facie evidence of a correlated hypothesis
meaning "I was supposed to begin my sentences with ’I'" because J3s
who report such hypotheses typically demonstrate performance gains.
Ironically, the j> in the present experiment, although appropriately
motivated, did not show a performance gain.

This £5 identified the

"correct" pronoun class in response to Question 12a (after which pro
nouns did E say "Good?") but said she had not written that in her
notes because "I didn't think of it in that way--I thought about sen
tences relating to self."

Obviously for this

the hypothesis of

relating sentences "to myself" had an entirely different meaning from
that of beginning sentences with "I."
cally, it was, in fact, incorrect.

Although correlated theoreti

Otherwise, according to cognitive

theory this j3 would have shown acquisition of the "correct" pronoun.
But what if this j> had demonstrated performance gains?

Would

it then be valid to infer that the increase was cognitively mediated?
To do so, it seems, would necessitate the assumption that the £3 was
trying to tell us what we wanted to hear but couldn't get the idea
across since, logically and statistically, such reports should be
correlated with the "correct" response class.

On the other hand,

could the (hypothesized) increase have been the result of the direct
and automatic strengthening effect of reinforcement?

The results of

the present experiment would support such an interpretation.

That

is, Ss reporting incorrect hypotheses who received an increase in
"programmed" reinforcement demonstrated significant performance
gains.

Conversely, _Ss who did not receive an increase did not differ

-
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from Control _Ss.

Interestingly enough, the S under discussion was in

the group which received no increase in "programmed" reinforcement, con
firming the impression that her apparent correlated hypothesis was
deceptive.
Although correlated hypotheses have long been recognized as a
likely source of contamination in studies reporting conditioning with
out awareness (Adams, 1957), surprisingly little attention has been
devoted to them in the literature.
that:

The findings of the present study,

(a) notes can be reliably used for rating awareness of correct

and incorrect hypotheses but not correlated hypotheses; (b) Ss who
develop correct hypotheses during the conditioning task readily ver
balize them early in the postconditioning interview whereas

presum

ably aware of correlated hypotheses often are perplexed in their note
writing and in the interview; (c) correlated hypotheses are likely to
be suggested to these £s by extensive postconditioning interviews;
and, (d) reports of apparent correlated hypotheses do not always mean
what the interviewer interprets them to mean, indicate that the range
of behaviors encompassed by correlated hypotheses is broad and ambigu
ous.

Of greatest interest was the unexpected finding that the perfor

mance of Ss reporting correlated hypotheses did not differ from that
of unaware _Ss.

The fact that the performance of the former was more

like that of unaware jjs than like Ss reporting correct hypotheses
strongly suggests that correlated hypotheses may often not be indi
cative of an awareness that existed during the conditioning task.
other words, since correlated hypotheses appear to encompass a wide

In
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range of behaviors, it is possible that correlated hypotheses may
approximate incorrect hypotheses as frequently as correct ones.
In view of this, the criticism directed against the early verbal
conditioning studies for failing to deal with the problem of correlated
hypotheses seems less conc&usLve.

Granted that some Ss who were aware

of correlated hypotheses were overlooked, it would appear highly im
probable that the conditioning demonstrated in all the early studies
could have been accounted for only by Ss aware of correlated hypoth
eses.

Conversely, it is not surprising that studies which have

employed detailed postconditioning interviews, which readily accepted
correlated hypotheses as indicative of awareness and which considered
performance gains as proof of this should, with one exception, never
find evidence of conditioning without awareness.

This is not to say

that postconditioning interviews have no part in verbal conditioning
research.

On the other hand, there does seem to be a limit as the

unexpected findings of Levin (1961) disclosed.

Nor does it mean that

correlated hypotheses are not frequently indicative of an awareness
that existed during the conditioning task.

It does suggest that

correlated hypotheses appear to lend themselves readily to misinter
pretation and should, therefore, be evaluated cautiously.

CONCLUSIONS

Cognitive investigators of verbal operant conditioning have
questioned the extension of principles of learning developed in the
animal laboratory to account for the events occurring in verbal con
ditioning situations.

In particular they have challenged the concept

of reinforcement by maintaining that the reinforcement given by E has
no reinforcing properties but, instead, possesses only information and
incentive value.

Thus, the reinforcing stimulus can have no effect

upon overt behavior (performance) unless mediated by a cognitive pro
cess labeled as awareness.

As might be expected, the research strat

egy of the cognitive investigators has been primarily directed toward
developing techniques to obtain evidence for the role of awareness in
verbal conditioning rather than investigating the parameters of rein
forcement .
The present study was designed to do both.

To evaluate the

role of awareness, the techniques (viz., "notes" and extensive inter
views) developed by cognitive researches were employed.

The role of

reinforcement was investigated by controlling for frequency of experi
ence with reinforcement through the use of "forced" Training trials.
The results obtained appear to justify the following conclusions
concerning the relation between reinforcement, performance gains, and
the learning of awareness in verbal conditioning.
First, performance gains (acquisition of the reinforced response
class) can occur in verbal conditioning prior to, or in the absence of,
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awareness as a function of reinforced practice.

This suggests that

performance and awareness are both dependent variables subject to the
same antecedent conditions (reinforcement)

and that reinforcement

exerts a differential effect upon the two.
Second, social relnforcers do not have the same strengthening
effect upon all j>s.

Individual differences in response to social re

inforcement appear to be related more to performance than awareness.
For some j3s small amounts of reinforcement seem to be sufficient to
produce noticeable changes in performance.
more apt to learn awareness.

In turn, these j3s are

For other J5s, presumably those who are

less responsive to social reinforcement, it appears that performance
gains are not likely to occur in the typical verbal conditioning situa
tion in the absence of more favorable conditions, such as a rather
sudden shift in the pattern of response selection.

Awareness does not

necessarily appear to be a consequence of this type conditioning.
Third, although the learning of awareness may precede perfor
mance gains in some cases, the conclusion by Spielberger and DeNike
(1966) that acquisition of the reinforced response cannot occur in the
absence of awareness appears to be an artifact of an insensitive
methodology for determining the temporal relationship between perfor
mance gains and awareness.
Fourth, hypotheses (notes) written by _Ss during the condition
ing task can be reliably used for assigning ratings of awareness or
unawareness.
Fifth, correlated hypotheses are the "twilight 2one" of verbal
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conditioning.

Assigning ratings from notes is less reliable than for

the other classifications and correlated hypotheses are likely to be
suggested by detailed postconditioning interviews.

In addition, they

are often deceptive and may be easily misinterpreted, and they may not
always be indicative of an awareness that existed during the condition
ing task.

They appear to be particularly susceptible to erroneous

ratings of awareness.

Implications and Suggestions for Future Research
The psychotherapeutic analogue of the problem of behavior modi
fication without awareness is whether a patient's behavior can change
without having first achieved "insight" (Kanfer, 1965).

Rather than

"insight" being necessary for behavior to change, the question has been
raised as to whether changed behavior in therapy increases the likeli
hood of the patient emitting the verbal behavior labeled as "insight"
by the therapist (Saslow, 1965).
that such may be the case.

Results of the present study suggest

That is, behavior change (performance

gains) more frequently preceded reports of awareness than was true of
the opposite sequence of events.

Further, present findings supported

the position of Krasner and Ullmann (1963) that reported awareness is
a verbal behavior influenced by the same variables that influence
other kinds of verbal operants.

This, in turn, implies that reports

of awareness or "insight" can be controlled pr produced by therapists
employing the social reinforcement model (see,e.g., Krasner and Ullmann,
1965).
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Present findings indicate that individual differences in re
sponse to social reinforcement play a prominent part in verbal condi
tioning studies and, by implication, in therapies employing the
reinforcement model.

Research in this area has primarily attempted to

establish a relationship between a given personality, intellectual or
socially desirable variable, and the conditioning of some verbal
operant as well as reports of awareness.

Yet, most of these efforts

have yielded contradictory and ambiguous results (see, e.g., Farber,
1963; Matarazzo et a l ., 1960; Williams, 1964).

One of the few clear-

cut demonstrations of such a relationship was reported by Timmons and
Noblin (1963),

These investigators found that Freudian oral and anal

character typesresponded differentially to positive verbal reinforce
ment in a verbal conditioning paradigm.

A later study (Noblin,

Timmons and Kael, 1966) found that oral and anal character types re
sponded differentially to negative as well as to positive reinforce
ment-.
Baron (1966) has recently suggested that less emphasis be
placed on personality characteristics and more weight be given to the
characteristics of the social reinforcement history of the individual.
It is Baron's thesis that the individual's past reinforcement history
produces an internal norm or frame of reference which influences his
present receptivity to social reinforcement (cf., Helson, 1964).
Such an assumption has apparently not been tested in the verbal condi
tioning situation using, as predictors, techniques which have been
developed for assessing j3s1 past histories of social reinforcement
(see, e.g., Crandall, 1963; Zigler, 1961).
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The most obvious suggestion for future research growing out of
the present experiment is that repeated assessments of awareness should
be employed in the typical verbal conditioning paradigm to see if the
precedence of performance gains does in fact obtain in the absence of
"forced" reinforcement.

Such a study is presently being planned.
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APPENDIX A

Postconditioning Awareness Interview

1.

What is your main idea about the rule or principle for con

structing sentences in this experiment?

What is your basis for this

conclusion?
2.

How did you go about making up your sentences?

3.

How did you go about deciding which of the words to use on

the card?

(If £> did not differentiate between Training and Test cards

he was asked to do so.)
a.

Did you think you were using some of the words on the
cards more often than others?

4.

Which words?

Why?

Did you think you were supposed to make your Test sentences

up in any particular way?
a.

Did you come to think that there was anything you were
supposed to say, or not say, on each Test sentence in
order to be correct?

b.

Did you think there was, or wasn't, any kind of correct
way for making up the Test sentences?

c.

Did you think there was anything the experimenter
wanted you to say or not say on the Test sentences?

(If, in answering Questions 1-4, S mentioned the fact that E
had said "Good," "Fine," or "Mmm-hmm," Questions 5-7 were not asked.)
5.

During the experiment did you notice the experimenter doing

anything in particular?
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6.

Did you notice that he said anything?

7.

Actually he did occasionally say something.

Thinking back

now, do you remember him saying anything while you were going through
the cards?
(If j> still did not verbalize "Good," etc. this was pointed out
to him and the interview continued.)
8.

Did you try to figure out what made the experimenter say

"Good?"
a.

Did you come to think that there was any purpose or
significance to the experimenter saying "Good," etc.

b.

Do you think it was random or did it follow anything
in particular that you did?

9.
trials

Do you think that his saying "Good," etc. on the Training

had anything to do with the words you chose to begin your Test

sentences?
a.

Did you think that you were supposed to change the
way in which you made up your Test sentences as the
experiment went along?

b.

Do you think you actually changed the way in which you
made up your Test sentences as the experiment went
along?

c.

How hard would you say you tried to improve your per
formance on the Test sentences?

d.

How did you go about trying to improve your Test sen
tences?
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e.

Did you usually construct your Test sentences according
to the ideas you wrote down during the experiment?

f.
10.

How helpful did you find the Training trials?

What was your reaction or attitude toward the experimenter

saying "Good," etc.?
a.

How hard would you say you tried to figure out what was
making him say "Good?"

Very hard?

Fairly hard?

Not

hard at all?
b.

Would you say you wanted the experimenter to say "Good"
very much, some, or didn't care one way or the other?

11.

I would like for you to state again your main

idea about

the rule or principle for constructing sentences in this experiment.
(If j3 added anything new, the following two questions were asked.)
a.

Is that something you were actually aware of while
going through the cards or is it something you thought
of since the interview began?

b.Did you write that in your notes?
12.

At any time while going through the cards didyou have the

idea that the experimenter was saying "Good" after sentences beginning
with certain pronouns?

If yes;

a.

Which pronouns?

b.

Did you write that in your notes?

(If no, j3 was asked

"Why not?")
c.

Did the fact that you realized this have any effect on
the way in which you made up your Test sentences?
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13.

Did you ever have the idea that the experimenter was saying

"Good” after sentences beginning with I and We?
a.
14.
before?

He- and They?

Why did he do that?

Have you ever participated in an experiment like this
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